Introduction
Many distinguished economists have their name associated with some theory, concept or tool in economics. Obvious examples include: Giffen goods, the Pigou effect, Nash equilibrium, the Coase theorem, the Phillips curve, the Rybczynski and StolperSamuelson theorems, Ricardian equivalence, the Engle curve, the EdgeworthBowley box, Tobin's q, and the Lucas critique. However, very few economists are honoured by having their name associated with a "law". Charles Goodhart joins Sir Thomas Gresham, Leon Walras, and Jean-Baptiste Say in a very select club.
In this paper we explain Goodhart's Law and the context in which it arose, and discuss whether it has the qualities that will help it survive over time. Mainly this requires that it can be adapted to new circumstances as the world changes. Gresham's law, for example, was invented to describe the problems that arose from the artificial fixing of gold and silver prices but it turned out to have applicability to a wider range of monetary regimes wherever currency substitution was possible. Dollarisation in Equador, and other countries, would be a contemporary example of 'good money drives out bad'.
We shall focus particularly closely on the comparison between Goodhart's Law and the enormously influential Lucas Critique. It could be argued, that Goodhart's Law and the Lucas critique are essentially the same thing. If they are, Robert Lucas almost certainly said it first. However, while both Goodhart's Law and the Lucas critique relate to the instability of aggregate macroeconomic relationships, we shall argue that there are significant differences. In particular, while the Lucas Critique has affected macroeconomic methods in general, Goodhart's Law has been more influential in monetary policy design --monetary targets are out and inflation targets are in.
What is Goodhart's Law and how did it arise?
The original statement of Goodhart's law can be found in one of two papers delivered by Charles to a conference in July 1975 at the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Goodhart (1975a, b) 1 . It reached a wider audience when the key paper was published in a volume edited by Courakis (1981) and then again in a volume of Charles' own papers (Goodhart, 1984) . The context is very clear, but since the statement of the law was a (jocular) aside rather than the main point of the paper, the interpretation is open to some questions.
Throughout the post-WWII period up until 1971, sterling had been pegged to the US dollar (with major devaluations in 1949 and 1967) and monetary policy was dominated by this constraint. Exchange controls were in place and the main clearing (commercial) banks were subject to various direct controls on their balance sheet expansion. In August 1971, however, the US closed the gold window and temporarily floated the dollar. There was a short-term patch-up of the pegged rate system under the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971, but sterling floated unilaterally from June 1972. Some alternative to the dollar as nominal anchor and some guiding principles for monetary policy in the new regime were needed. outlines how research originating from the Bank and that of outside academics had indicated that there was a stable money demand function in the UK.
The implication of this finding for monetary policy was deemed to be that the relationship could be used to control monetary growth via the setting of short-term interest rates, without resort to quantitative restrictions. The relevant section of the key paper reads as follows:
"The econometric evidence seemed to suggest that, one way or another, whether by restraining bank borrowing or by encouraging non-bank debt sales, higher interest rates did lead to lower monetary growth. In one fell swoop, therefore, these demand-for-money equations appeared to promise: (1) that monetary policy would be effective; (2) that an 'appropriate' policy could be chosen and monitored; (3) that the 'appropriate' level of the monetary aggregates could be achieved by market operations to vary the level of interest rates.
[……] these findings, which accorded well with the temper of the times, helped to lead us beyond a mere temporary suspension of bank ceilings towards a more general reassessment of monetary policy. The main conclusions of this were that the chief intermediate objectives of monetary policy should be the rates of growth of the monetary aggregates, i.e. the money stock, in one or other of its various definitions, or DCE (and not particular components of these, such as bank lending to the private sector), and that the main control instrument for achieving these objectives should be the general price mechanism (i.e. movements in interest rates) within a freely competitive financial system." The 'competition and credit control' reforms, which removed direct controls on bank lending, had been introduced in September 1971 and a dramatic surge in bank intermediation, leading to broad money growth rates in excess of 25%, had resulted in 1972 and 1973. The conclusion drawn by policy makers in 1973 was that the only option was to supplement monetary targets with direct controls on banks through Supplementary Special Deposits known as 'the Corset' (See Zawadzki, 1981) .
Modest interest rate changes seemed powerless in the face of this monetary expansion and the previously stable money demand function seemed to have broken down. This was clear well before 1975, but Goodhart (1975b) was a summary of the current problems of monetary management, as the title suggests.
Goodhart's Law is the statement missing from the square brackets in the quotation above. It says: "Ignoring Goodhart's law, that any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes". This makes the observation that previously estimated relationships (especially between the nominal interest rate and the nominal money stock---item (3) in the full quote above) had broken down. But as we shall see below this does not necessarily have any implications for the stability or otherwise of the demand function for real money balances, even though this was how the law was later interpreted.
The proximate meaning of the law is clear. Bank economists thought that they could achieve a particular rate of growth of the money stock by inverting the money demand equation that had existed under a different regime. But in the 1971-1973 period this did not work, as it appeared that the old relationship had broken down. The "law"
states that this will always happen when policy makers use such statistically-estimated relationships as the basis for policy rules. Howe, labelled by his predecessor Denis Healey as a 'believing monetarist', attempted to target the growth rate of the money supply (£M3) by use of the official interest rate, after exchange controls were abolished in October 1979 and the Corset then became impossible to maintain. Targets were set for £M3 (broad money excluding balances in foreign currency) to lie in the range 7-11 per cent for the period 1980-81 falling by one percent per annum to 4-8 percent by 1983-4. In the event, however, money growth overshot its target by 100 per cent in the first two-and-a-half years. The abolition of exchange controls and the Corset (and the financial innovations that followed) meant that the relationship between broad money and nominal incomes fundamentally altered (see Goodhart, 1989) .
Although it was becoming apparent by 1982 that the velocity trend had changed, partly because the relaxation of credit controls and exchange controls had redirected much foreign business back through the British banking system, Nigel Lawson, the new Chancellor appointed in 1983, reasserted his confidence in monetary targeting by publishing further growth targets often for several years ahead. The Medium Term Financial Strategy was largely unsuccessful, however, (at least in controlling money growth) and this led to the conclusion that monetary targeting of all types was flawed.
It was dropped in the summer of 1985 in favour of exchange rate shadowing.
Not only was the link from the policy interest rate to money unstable but so also was the link from (broad) money to aggregate demand. Monetary stability seemed (in some people's view) to be achievable by a fixed exchange rate in which the money supply was endogenous rather than by a money targeting policy. We return later to the issue of whether 'money' should have an active role in monetary policy. At this stage we just note the irony that Charles Goodhart is probably one of the few UK economists who does think that money matters and yet his law was repeatedly quoted in the 1980s to support the case for ignoring money entirely, or at least for monetary targets having no explicit role in monetary policy. We shall show some evidence on why this was in the next section.
A number of observations on the context in which the law arose are now appropriate.
First, it should not have been too surprising, even at the time , that removal of direct quantitative controls would lead to a surge of bank intermediation and that some adjustment period would follow. That this happened is not in itself evidence that the demand for money is in any sense unstable. Indeed, as Artis and Lewis (1984) have pointed out (and we revisit their results below), subsequent adjustments to prices, output and interest rates did return money balances relative to nominal GDP to their long-run relationship by the second half of the 1970s. The supply shock of a new operating procedure and abolition of credit rationing caused agents to acquire excess nominal money balances, but these were rapidly eliminated in the standard textbook fashion by bidding up goods and property prices---the 25 per cent plus money growth in 1972-3 led to 25 per cent plus inflation in 1974-5. Equally, the abolition of the corset in 1980 could have been expected to lead to a surge of broad money growth in the early 1980s. That this surge happened at a time when the economy was heading into a sharp recession and inflation was falling in no way proves that money does not matter….it just indicates that it is not the only thing that matters.
Far from Goodhart's Law having an immediate impact on policy in the mid-1970s, events persuaded even politicians that money mattered and that money growth needed to be controlled in order to avoid excessive inflation 2 . Goodhart's Law only really came into its own as an influence on policy in the early 1980s when, following abolition of the Corset, broad money growth again surged. But, as noted above, this time the rapid growth of broad money coincided with a sharp recession and a decline in inflation, so the usefulness of monetary targets came into serious question.
Simultaneously the financial markets experienced a period of deregulation and product innovation that altered the conventional role for money as a non-interestbearing asset. Explicit targets were eventually dropped.
2 Not all were persuaded however. Denis Healey, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, was sceptical of monetarist theories and monetary statistics. Raising doubts about the ability of economic forecasters to predict accurate ranges for monetary growth, he claimed to have decided to 'do for economic forecasters what the Boston Strangler did for door-to-door salesmen -to make them distrusted forever'. The statistics on which the forecasts were based were received several weeks after the end of month collection date and were prone to revisions, so that new vintages of the monetary numbers could tell quite different stories to the early data. Goodhart recalls his experiences in the Bank of England, discussing the data on monthly growth rates in relation to a five month moving average as a guide to the trend: 'The standard deviation from the moving average is large in relation to the calculated values of that moving average. We receive the data several weeks after the monthly make-up date. The noise in the series is so loud that it takes us several months to discern a systematic trend with any confidence. … So the movements in the series, when the systematic trends can be interpreted, tell you where you have been, not necessarily where you are going. That at least is something. ' Goodhart 1989 pp. 112-113. The second observation is that, notwithstanding the general loss of interest in money during the 1980s, there is plenty of evidence that there remains a plausible and stable long-run money demand relationship. Once allowances are made for the types of financial innovation that occurred in the 1980s, such as the introduction of interest bearing current accounts and money market mutual funds, and some distinction is allowed between retail and wholesale balances the money demand function returns to normality. Were we to use a Divisia measure of money we would find that the correction for the effects of financial innovation would restore the stable money demand function, which is in any event evident using standard simple-sum aggregates within specific sectors, if not at the aggregate level 3 .
The third observation is that, while the apparent breakdown of the money demand relationship that led to the original statement of Goodhart's Law persuaded the authorities to return to the use of direct controls, there is a plausibly interpretation of Goodhart's Law that would imply that such controls will not work for long. For example, let us suppose that over some period it were shown that the growth rate of broad money (M4) was a good leading indicator of inflation, so that the authorities decided to control the growth rate of banks' deposit liabilities by the fiat imposition of quantitative ceilings. Without other measures to control aggregate demand, the previously existing statistical relationship between broad money and inflation would be expected to shift as other channels of intermediation evolve, bypassing the distortions to the financial system. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in the second half of the 1970s, even though Goodhart's Law was intended to apply to the prior period when direct controls were absent. £M3 was controlled directly because that had been correlated with inflation (with a lag), but inflation picked up anyway and the controls were unsustainable once exchange controls were abolished. In many ways this is a better example of a statistical relationship breaking down when 'pressure was put on for control purposes' than the 1971-3 episode which spawned to Schmid (1998) argues that the Bundesbank's success can be attributed to the dominance of the universal banking system, and the low inflation environment that gave no incentive for banks to develop new financial instruments. Without significant deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets that had taken place elsewhere, German monetary policy was presented with fewer challenges because the basic financial relationships, including the money demand function, were essentially reliable.
The Artis and Lewis riposte
In this section we redo the Artis and Lewis (1984) analysis with an updated data set.
We calculate the inverse of velocity of circulation of money, using a measure of annual broad money defined by the Capie and Webber (1985) data series for £M3 Our regression line is remarkably similar in slope to previous studies, although the intercept differs due to the fact that our data series are scaled differently. As with the Artis and Lewis paper we can observe the disequilibrium period in the early 1970s on Chart 1 (which was removed using dummy variables before estimating the regression line) 6 . The breakdown of the demand for money function is apparent during the period preceding the creation of Goodhart's law, although the relationship quickly reestablished itself.
We now repeat this exercise but this time using the official M4 series instead of M2.
The outcome gives a very clear illustration of why Goodhart's law was widely quoted in the 1980s as being the explanation of why monetary targeting was inappropriate.
Here we calculate inverse velocity using a monetary aggregate based on Capie and
Webber's data up to 1963 then splicing with M4 to the present 7 , divided by the same 5 A consistent M2 series is only available from 1982, and M3 cannot be used after the mid-1980s owing to building society conversions. 6 The series used in this regression are non-stationary, so to deal with the potential spurious regression problem we estimated the relationship using the Johansen procedure for the sample 1920 -2000. We found evidence of a single cointegrating relationship with slightly smaller intercept and slope coefficients than the OLS estimates. 7 The official series for M4 starts in 1963, so we are using the longest run of this available.
income measure as before. We plot this against the Consol rate in Chart 2. The estimate of the regression line is calculated using a similar method and is compared to the data points. From 1982 onwards we can see a steady increase in the ratio of money to income for a given interest rate, which represents the effect of financial innovation. As the broader components of money included in M4 (but not in M2 and thus held mainly by firms and other financial corporations (OFCs)) offered more competitive rates of interest and/or sterling wholesale financial activity increased, so the stock of M4 increased relative to income. The set of data points clearly represents a different money demand function for the 1980s and 1990s which has shifted to the right, even though the demand function for retail deposits (M2) was broadly unchanged.
This shift we would argue is probably little to do with the use of M4 as a targeted aggregate but rather is the product of financial liberalisation and the rapid growth of wholesale money markets in London. In the Loughborough Lecture, the then 
Goodhart's Law and the Lucas Critique
Goodhart 's Law (1975) predates the publication of the Lucas critique (1976), but the Lucas paper was presented at a Carnegie-Rochester conference in April 1973 and circulated more widely prior to publication (Savin and Whitman,1992) This states, in the context of quantum physics, that the observation of a system fundamentally disturbs it. Hence, the process of observing an electron, which requires that a photon of light should bounce off it and pass through a microscope to the eye, alters the characteristics of the physical environment being observed because the impact of the proton on the electron will change its momentum. A system cannot be observed without a change to the system itself being introduced.
Perhaps an even more relevant and long-running literature is that in social science that discusses the problems of research on social interactions where both the observation of behaviour and the public reporting of it can change the behaviour observed. It is not just that people behave differently when they know that they are being watched, but also their belief systems can change when they later read what has been written about them. In a very clear sense, the intervention of researchers can change the nature of the relationships being studied.
Haavelmo (1944) offered observations on the problem of invariance applied to economics in his article 'The probability approach in econometrics'. The invariance issue is illustrated by the problem an engineer faces in attempting to record the relationship between use of the throttle and the speed of a car. Although he may observe that this relationship appears to be well defined for a level track under uniform conditions, it will alter when the conditions are allowed to vary.
Nevertheless, there will be some conditions that are invariant even if other aspects of the environment change, examples include the physical laws describing gravitation, thermodynamics etc. Haavelmo considered that there are degrees of 'autonomy' that define how likely it is that a relationship will vary with variation in the other conditions of the experiment. Physical laws are 'autonomous' in the sense that they do not change, but other relationships such as the relation between throttle and speed are variant or 'non-autonomous' to differing degrees. Autonomous relations have
properties that appear to be laws, but non-autonomous relations do not.
In the field of economics, decisions of the private sector determine the state of the economic system, but the public sector, in the process of choosing and implementing policy actions, has an effect on the system itself such that the system is not invariant It is apparent from this analysis that the Lucas Critique is a statement about economic modelling and policy evaluation. It is a statement by a theorist about methodology of economic enquiry. The Critique makes statements about the inappropriateness of modelling an economy as if the structure were invariant across policy regimes, because expectations about policy choices will feed back to the crucial equations estimated in the model. Lucas proposes a remedy, through the development of the rational expectations literature and the related VAR modelling, a method that either uncovers the deep parameters of behavioural equations, or restricts itself to modelling the implementation of existing rules for fixed policy regimes in such a way that historically estimated models are not distorted (see Savin and Whitman, 1992) . All of this is purely methodological, and refers to the way that modelling ought to be done.
The Lucas Critique develops a variation on the identification problem in econometrics, where the true structure of a system of economic relationships is unobservable from the available data because there are no independent variables to identify the individual equations. Economic models are described in such a way that policy choices and exogenous variables influence the future value of state variables, but the Lucas Critique reminds the modeller that even the structure and parameters of the model can change with different policy choices. Despite Haavelmo's prior claim to define the identification problem in the context of the invariance problem, Hoover (1994) indicates the significance of Lucas' work in a neat summary that notes 'Lucas was not the first to recognise the invariance problem explicitly, his own important contribution to it is to observe that one of the relations frequently omitted from putative causal representations is that of the formation of expectations' (p69).
So where does Goodhart's Law fit into this methodological setting? Is it just a variation of the insights of Haavalmo and Lucas? Goodhart's Law, as the discussion above has illustrated, arose in the context of a specific monetary control problem. In this sense, the Law is an application of the invariance problem to a particular institutional, monetary phenomenon. The observation arises from the performance of a 'statistical regularity', but lays down implications that follow from the application of policy based on these apparent regularities, rather than the guiding principles for econometric models. Nevertheless the idea is closely linked to the Lucas Critique by In discussion of the implications of changes in policy rules for the estimation of interest and income elasticities in the money demand function, Gordon (1984) shows that instability in the money demand function may be induced by policy changes such as the switch from interest rate to monetary base targeting. This is cited with approval by Goodhart in his discussion of the monetary targeting experiences in the US and the UK 10 . It is little wonder that Goodhart's Law has been associated so closely with money demand functions, but this is only one of its many applications.
The Long Arm of the Law
Goodhart's Law is not only about the demand for money. In general application it refers to any 'statistical regularity', which is relied upon 'for control purposes', it is therefore equally applicable to a range of other behavioural statistical relationships.
We could take the recent interest in the Taylor rule, for example. Some authors have considered that it should be treated as more than an estimate of the policy reaction function, and should be used as a guide for policy (Taylor, 2001) . Others have evaluated the estimated function to explore its feasibility in this respect (Clarida et al. 1998 , Nelson, 2000 , and Orphanides, 2001 11 . We shall consider some of the issues relating to this point in this section. 10 More recently the US demand for money relationship has been rehabilitated to some extent. Lown et al. (1999) have show that the unusual growth of the M2 aggregate in the US, and hence the uncharacteristic behaviour of velocity, was largely due to the financial condition of depository institutions. Revisions to the data accounting for capital constrained banks and thrifts remove the anomaly in the demand for money function. Equally, Carlson et al. (2000) allowing for depository restructuring that led households to readjust their portfolios towards mutual funds deals with the velocity shift of the early 1990s. This also reinstates the stable broad money demand function. Ball (2001) has a simpler solution still. By extending the data set beyond the 1980s the instability in parameter values is removed and an income elasticity of 0.5 and a negative interest semi-elasticity is restored.
The Taylor rule might be thought of as the present day equivalent of the 'stable' money demand of the 1970s. Proposed by John Taylor (1993) , the Taylor rule has emerged as a simple but robust estimate of the monetary policy rule operated by a range of central banks. Clearly the rule has some major advantages in that it is simple, depends on only two variables that require data that are relatively easy to collect, and it provides a timely indicator of the instrument setting given inflation and output. Above all it seems to be able to explain the past history of monetary policy setting, particularly in the United States, but increasingly also for other G7 countries, following the taming of inflation by independent central banks using inflation targets (cf Clarida et al. 1998) . While minor changes such as forward versus backward looking behaviour and closed versus open economy characteristics offer minor improvements, the basic rule appears remarkably robust (Taylor 2000 (Taylor , 2001 . But how robust would this rule remain, with its parameter values of 1.5 on inflation and 0.5 on the output gap, if the relationship were to be used for control purposes?
The point where Goodhart's Law becomes relevant is when this 'statistical regularity' in whether the use of the rule for control purposes might alter its properties. The question is whether the rule would be reliable as a simple policy rule for ex ante rate setting. We can make some observations even in the absence of any evidence from its use for control purposes.
11 Note that a number of papers consider the predictions of the Taylor rule against the actual outturn using historical or real-time data to evaluate the policy not the rule. Examples include Taylor (1999) , Orphanides (2000) and Nelson (2000) .
Ben McCallum (2000) has argued that if the Taylor rule is valid then we can arm a 'clerk with a calculator' in place of a monetary policymaker. Svensson (2001) for one has argued that this is a dangerous step to take since a simple policy rule like the Taylor should be so widely applicable to historical regimes reported by Taylor (1999b) or a range of monetary policy operating procedures is startling.
Consistent parameter values may not be the basis for good performance in setting rates, however. The performance of the Taylor rule as a predictor of the next rate change has been evaluated in-sample and out-or-sample in recent work by Chavapatrakul, Mizen and Kim (2001) . There are three main conclusions that emerge from the paper. The first is that the Taylor rule, for all its durability at the quarterly frequency over a range of industrialised countries, does not emerge as a robust relationship at the monthly frequency with which UK monetary authorities set interest rates. Only for a very specific three-month horizon, with a quadratically-detrended output series, can the Taylor rule be replicated over the sample 1992 -2001. More worryingly, within sample, the Taylor rule predicts base rate changes reasonably accurately within sample, but it does so because the main prediction is 'no change'
and this occurs about 70 per cent of the time. It has the same accuracy in forecasting as a stopped clock, which can also be right some of the time (twice a day). Out of sample, the same result holds, and alternative wider-information sets dominate the rule. This suggests that irrespective of whether the rule would remain robust to the decision to change its use for control purposes, its performance is inferior in rate setting compared to quite simple alternatives, let alone committee members who exercise judgement.
Of course, if central banks were very successful in applying a policy rule to offset shocks accurately, then the Taylor rule would certainly break down as a description of policy. This is because activity would be maintained at potential output and inflation would be exactly on target. Official interest rate changes would be unrelated to the output gap and deviations from the inflation target. Rather they would be closely related to the shocks that policy had been required to offset.
However, as Mervyn King has noted, there is certainly a great deal of common sense in the Taylor rule in retrospect in a world in which central banks cannot identify and offset shocks ex ante. "Central banks that have been successful appear ex post to have been following a Taylor rule even if they had never heard of that concept when they were actually making decisions." (Inflation Report press briefing February 10 th 1999).
Any sensible central banker should change interest rates in response to projected deviations of inflation from target and widening output gaps. However, the difference between the use of the rule as a summary of past behaviour and as a predictor of future behaviour is considerable. Goodhart's Law suggests that a change in the use of the rule would tend to undermine the dependability of the statistical regularity.
Fortunately no central banker has succumbed to the temptation to take this satisfactory ex post relationship between the short-term interest rate, inflation and output deviations from trend and attempt to use is as an ex ante guide for monetary policy making, so perhaps the statistical regularity is safe. This is potentially where reliance on a simple policy rule for monetary policy setting rather than a targeting rule could upset the achievements that have been made. The development in the literature of robust, forward-looking rules takes us further from the simplest equations, and increasingly towards approaches that build in judgment and other information relevant to the policymaker.
Wider Implications for Monetary Policymaking
If the use of intermediate variables is always flawed then it is important for the ECB to assert that its monetary pillar is not intended as a target as such but rather as an anchor to inflation expectations over the medium term (see Issing, 1997; Issing et al 2001) . The role for central banks has been known for some time to be one of 'teaching by doing ' (King, 1996) in the realm of monetary policy. Artis et al (1998) explain We have come some way from the circumstance in which the central bank takes the world as given and fails to recognise the importance of shaping expectations.
Goodhart's Law, in as much as it resembles the Lucas critique in the monetary policy sphere, is consistent with the implication that failure to recognise the importance of expectations over behavioural relationships will result in failure. The name of the game in the 1990s and beyond is to attach the public's expectation of inflation to the inflation target. Central banks now shape expectations rather than ignoring them.
Conclusions
The conclusion we draw from this article is that Goodhart's Law has many parallels in the world of physics, econometrics and economic modelling, but it has a unique niche this complex set of relationships into a simple statistical regularity that can then be used to set policy will recur, but Goodhart's Law is a warning against it. None of this, of course, implies that central banks can safely ignore "money", and we feel sure that
Charles himself would not wish his law to be quoted solely with that end in mind.
Inflation is inevitably about one thing: the value of money. 
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